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Courts have historically taken a solicitous interest in the
welfare of sailors, infants, and incompetents. Similarly, courts have
also spread their parental wings over another class perceived to be
easily disadvantaged and economically intimidated - those who
purchase policies of insurance. 1 It would be naive to consider the
direction the courts will take on any specific issue in insurance law
without realizing that there are three factors involved: (1) principles
of contract law, (2) public policy, and (3) a considerable dose of
paternalism. For example, what began with the established
principle that any ambiguity in a contract term shall be strictly
construed against the party who drafts the contract, 2 has recently
*Professor of Law, Villanova Law School. Author of "Insurance Law in a Nutshell," West
Pub. Co. (1981).
I. See Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REv. 961 (1970)
[hereinafter Keeton] (discussion of the courts' solicitous treatment of insureds).
2. See, e.g., Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1947). In
construing a policy provision. Judge Learned Hand, writing for the malority of the court, stated
that, "[a]n underwriter might so understand the phrase, when read in its context, but the application
was not to be submitted to underwriters; it was to go to persons utterly unacquainted with the
niceties of life insurance, who would read it colloquially. It is the understanding of such person that
counts ... " Id. at 601 (footnote omitted).
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blossomed into widespread instances of total departure from the
terms of the written contract itself.3 Courts have construed contract
terms, whether ambiguous or not, to enforce the "reasonable
expectations" of the insured, and thereby enforce the policy. 4
If the court's paternalistic approach in this area seems to be an
unusual incursion into the territory of advocacy, it is hardly an
isolated aberration.5 In fact, this approach typifies the orientation
of the majority of courts, and was the precursor of the most recent
phenomenon of judicial protectionism - the "bad faith" claim for
relief. This claim arises when a liability insurer fails to comply with
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in deciding
whether or not to settle an action brought against the insured by a
third party. 6 This Article focuses on the next step beyond the
creation of that claim for relief in order to consider just how
unrelenting the courts' protectiveness of the insured's interests is
likely to be. In particular, if the insured breaches an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in refusing to accept'a
reasonable settlement to the detriment of the insurer, will the court
be equally agile in fashioning an equivalent "bad faith" cause of
action for the insurer? Or will the outcome, in fact, depend on
whose ox is being gored?
The latter issue has received scant attention from the courts,
perhaps because of the insurers' pessimism regarding its chances
of success in such an action. The existing case law is split on the two
sides of the issue.7 In order to realistically evaluate whether or not
3. See Young, Lewis & Lee, Insurance Contract Interpretation: Issues and Trends, 625 INS. LJ. 71
(1975) (explaining the doctrines used by courts to interpret insurance contracts).
4. See, e.g., C. &J. Fertilizer Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 277 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975) (insured
able to recover even though an objective policy holder could not reasonably expect coverage from
reading the policy); Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1966)
(insured's reasonable expectations honored even though exclusionary language was clear and
unambiguous). '
5. See, e.g., Mid-States Ins. Co. v. Brandon, 340 Ill. App. 470, 92 N.E.2d 540(1950). In Brandon
the court increased the quantum of proof necessary to prove misrepresentation on the part of the
insured. Id. at __ , 92 N.E.2d at 542. The court required the insurer to prove that the insured
intended to deceive the insurer and that the misrepresentation materially affected the risk assumed
by the company. Id. at -, 92 N.E.2d at 541. The court construed chapter 13 S 766 of the Illinois
Revised Statutes to require that the insurer prove both actual intent and increased risk to establish
misrepresentation on the parts of the insured. See id. Compare ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 73, 5 766 (1949)
with Mid-States Ins. Co. v. Brandon, 340 Ill. App. 470, -., 92 N.E.2d 540, 541 (1950) (the statute
used the disjunctive "or," while the court read this provision conjunctively). See also Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Bruno, 309 Mass. 7, 33 N.E.2d 519 (1941). In Bruno the court held that the answer,
"no," to the application question: "Have you ever had any ailment or disease of. . . (c) the stomach
or intestine, liver, kidneys or genitourinary organs?" was not a misrepresentation in spite of the fact
that the applicant at the time had cancer of the stomach. Id. at -, 33 N.E.2d at 520.
6. See, e.g., Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1958). For a
discussion of Brown, see infra notes 19-65 and accompanying text.
7. CompareCommercial Union Assurance Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 921, 610
P.2d 1038, 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 714 (1980) ("policy providing for excess insurance coverage
imposes no implied duty upon the insured to accept a settlement offer which would avoid exposing
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the majority will ultimately give life to a bad faith cause of action
for the benefit of insurers, it is necessary to review the roots of the
claim for relief to see what considerations have nurtured it to its
current healthy state in favor of insureds.
II. ORIGINS OF THE BAD FAITH CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Consider this typical situation: An insured under a liability
policy with an upper limit of $100,000 is sued by a third party for
negligently causing injury. The amount requested for damages is
$200,000 and the plaintiff's negligence claim is reasonably sound.
The defendant's insurer takes control of the defense, as is its right
and duty under the policy. Prior to trial, the plaintiff offers to settle
the case for $100,000. The insurer is now faced with divided
loyalties. From its perspective, the insurer would lose no more if the
jury found for the plaintiff for the full $200,000 than if it accepted
the settlement for $100,000, since in either case it would be paying
no more than the policy limit of $100,000. On the other hand, if the
insurer chose to gamble by rejecting the settlement offer, the jury
might return a verdict in favor of the defendant, in which case the
insurer would save money. From the insured's point of view,
however, acceptance of the settlement offer would save the insured
from having to pay the amount of any jury verdict in excess of the
policy limit. If the insurer chose to gamble on a jury verdict, it
would be gambling exclusively with the insured's money.
As early as 1923, a case presented circumstances similar to
those stated above. In Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co." an insured
brought an action against its insurer after the insurer had refused to
settle the action. 9 The court applied the contract of insurance as it
was written without implying any proinsured gloss.' 0 The court
stated that "[t]here is nothing in the policy by which the insurance
company obligated itself to settle, if an opportunity presented itself.
It was given the option to settle, if it saw fit to do so, or to try the
action as it preferred. It, however, was under no legal obligation,
either express or implied, to compromise or settle the claims prior
to trial."'1
the insurer to liability") with Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 131, .1b6
Cal. R ptr. 360, 364 (1979) (with regard to acceptance of settlements, the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing burdens both the policy holder and the carrier). For a discussion of Spink, see
infra notes 113-30 and accompanying text.
8. 236 N.Y. 247, 140 N.E. 577 (1923).
9. Auerbach v. Maryland Casualty Co., 236 N.Y. 247, 251, 140 N.E. 577, 578 (1923).
10. See id. at 252, 140 N.E. at 578-79.
11. Id. at-.., 140 N.E. at 579. The court also noted that "[the] plaintiffs, when they accepted
the policy, did so with full knowledge of the fact, if an action were brought, that they surrendered to
the insurance company absolute, full, and complete control of it, including the settlement or trial."
Id.
19861
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In 1931 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was even
more emphatic in Long v. Union Indemnity Co., 12 a case in which an
insurer settled the action over the protests of the insured. 13 The
court concluded that [a]n insurance company, . .. has an absolute
right to dispose of an action brought against its assured.., in such
way as may appear to it for its best interests."' 4 The court stated
that the insurer need not consider the interest of the insured if the
parties' interests conflict. 15 Moreover, the court stated that "the
fact of protest by the insured is immaterial." 1 6
By 1958 there existed substantial case and statutory law that
had the effect of erecting a protective shield for insureds. 17
Principles of contract law had given way time and again to the
court's zeal in meeting the "reasonable expectations" of the
insured as opposed to the insured's actual rights under the written
contract.' 8 It was from this perspctive that the California Supreme
Court approached the issue presented in the case of Brown v.
Guarantee Insurance Co. 19
In Brown the insured had taken out an automobile liability
policy in the amount of $5000.20 The plaintiff claimed damages of
$15,000 for bodily injury, allegedly caused by the insured's
negligent driving.21  The action was defended by insurer's
attorney. 22 Prior to trial, the plaintiff offered to settle the action for
12. 277 Mass. 428, 178 N.E. 737 (1931).
13. Long v. Union Indem. Co., 277 Mass. 428, 178 N.E. 737 (1931).
14. Id. at_ , 178 N.E. at 738.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 186 (West 1972). Section 186 provides as
follows:
No oral or written misrepresentation or warranty made in the negotiation of a policy of
insurance by the insured or in his behalf shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid
the policy or prevent its attaching unless such misrepresentation or warranty is made
with actual intent to deceive, or unless the matter misrepresented or made a warranty
increased, the risk of loss.
Id.; seealsoTEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 6.14 (Vernon 1981). Article 6.14 provides as follows:
No breach or violation by the insured of any warranty, condition or provision of any
fire insurance policy, contract of insurance, or applications therefor, upon personal
property, shall render void the policy or contract, or constitute a defense to a suit for
loss thereon, unless such breach or violation contributed to bring about the destruction
of the property.
Id. For an example of cases that have erected a protective shield for insureds, see supra note 5.
18. See Keeton, supra note 1, at 966-67. Keeton recognizes that the adhesionary nature of
insurance contracts has resulted in the creation ofjudicial tools which courts have used to counteract
the inequities inherent in insurance contracts. Id.; see also Comment, The Ambziui y in the Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations, 62 N.D.L. Rev. 423 (1986) (authored by Kenneth j. Homer, Jr.).
19. 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 319 P.2d 69 (1958).





the policy limit of $5000.23 The insurer not only rejected the offer,
but refused to make a pretrial counter-offer. 24 The insured's
position was simply that "unless [it] could save some money on the
settlement, [it] had no reason to settle." ' 25 To make the case even
more appealing from the point of view of the insured, the insurer
never notified the insured that the action could be settled within
policy limits. 26 Further, the insurer failed to suggest that the
insured engage separate counsel to protect his interests in the
case. 27 Ultimately, the action resulted in a judgment for the
plaintiff for $15,000, of which the insurer paid only the policy limit
of $5000.28 The remaining judgment debt of $10,000 forced the
insured into bankruptcy. 29 Thereafter, the bankruptcy trustee
assigned the insured's potential claim against the insurer to the
plaintiff in the original action. 30
The issue presented to the California District Court of Appeals
was whether the insured had a claim for relief against his insurer for
damages caused by the failure of the insurer to accept a reasonable
settlement within policy limits. 31 The issue was one of first
impression in California. 32 In feeling its way to a conclusion, the
court discussed two sides of the public policy issue. 33 On the one
hand, without such a claim for relief, the insurer would have the
power to reject the most reasonable offer of settlement, within
policy limits, in order to gamble on the outside chance of a
favorable verdict. 34 If the gamble were lost, the economic detriment
would fall solely on the insured. 35 On the other hand, if the court
recognized such a claim for relief, the insured might demand that
the insurer settle any baseless action brought against the insured. 36
Thus, the insured could require the insurer to settle or face the
23. Id.
24. Id. Although the insurer did not make a counter-offer prior to trial, at different times during




28. Id. The insurer, in addition to the $5000, paid the plaintiffS138.50 in costs. Id.
29. See id. at -_, 319 P.2d at 71.
30. Id.
31. See id. The court was also faced with the issue of whether or not the insured's claim for relief
against the insurer could be transferred from the trustee in bankruptcy to the plaintiff. Id. at -,
319 P.2d at 77. The court noted that claims for relief under contract law are assignable while claims
for relief under tort law are assignable only if they affect the assignor's property. Id. at __, 319
P.2d at 78-79. The court concluded that the wrongful act affected the insurer's "pocketbook"
and therefore the claim for relief was assignable. Id. at ,319 P.2d at 79.
32. Id. at-_, 319 P.2d at 72.
33. See id. at -, 319 P.2d at 71.
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prospects of a suit by the insured. 37 The potential for selfishness on
either side was inherent in the conflict of interest. 38
The decisive factor in the court's decision was the fact that the
insurer typically had the sole power to prepare the defense of the
action against the insured and to negotiate any settlement. 39 The
court therefore decided that it must afford some protection to the
interests of the insured. 40
The court noted that there were three possible theoretical
justifications for the claim for relief.41 At common law, courts
generally concluded that all contracts contained an implied
covenant that each party would act fairly and in good faith to do
nothing that would deprive the other party of the benefits of the
contract. 42 On the basis of this common-law principle, the first
alternative was to recognize an insured's claim for relief for breach
of contract if the insurer violated this implied covenant by refusing
to accept a reasonable settlement. 43 The second alternative was to
view the insurer as an agent or fiduciary and to apply the standards
applicable to that relationship. 44 The third alternative was to create
a claim for relief in tort for the benefit of the insured. 45 The court
adopted the final alternative. 46
In instituting the tort claim for relief, the first step was to
define the insurer's duty to the insured, the breach of which would
lead to liability for resultant damages. 47 The court concluded that
the insurer must exercise "good faith and fair dealing" in deciding
to accept or reject an offer of settlement. 4 This standard however,
gives the parties little practical guidance in an actual fact situation.
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id. at __, 319 P.2d at 72. The court noted that insurance policy provisions normally
prohibit the insurer from participating in the defense of the action. Id. In such situations, the insured
has forfeited his right to defend against an action to the insurer, who may have conflicting interests
regarding possible settlement. See id.
40. See id. at -. , 319 P.2d at 71.
41. Id. (quoting Georgia Life Ins. Co. v. Mississippi Cent. R.R., 116 Miss. 114, 76 So. 646
(1917)).
42. See, e.g., Brown v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 2d 559, 564, 212 P.2d 878, 881 (1949) (all
contracts contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing which prohibits one party from
acting in a way that prevents the other party from receiving the benefits of the contract); Ireland v.
Charlesworth, 98 N.W.2d 223, 224 (N.D. 1959) (every party to a contract implicitly agrees not to act
in a manner that makes the other party's performance impossible or impracticable).
43. See 155 Cal. App. 2d at -, 319 P.2d at 7 1; see also Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.,
50 Cal. 2d 659, -, 328 P.2d 198, 203 (1958) (choosing to treat the bad faith claim as being based
on contract rather than tort).
44. 155 Cal. App. 2d at - , 319 P.2d at 71 (quoting Georgia Life Ins. Co. v. Mississippi
R.R., 116 Miss. 114, 76So. 646(1917)).
45. Id.
46. See id. at__, 319 P.2d at 75.
47. See id. at __, 319 P.2d at 71.
48. Seeid. at-_, 319 P.2d at 74-79.
360 [VOL. 62:355
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Therefore, the court attempted to refine the standard by
interpreting it to mean that, in making the settlement decision, the
insurer must consider the interests of both itself and the insured.4 9
The court quickly limited the insurer's duty to protect the
insured. 50 The court noted that " 'It]he insurer is under no duty to
compromise a claim for the sole benefit of its insured if to continue
the fight offers a fair and reasonable prospect of escaping liability
under its policy or of getting off for less than the policy limit.' "51
The court also refused to change the culpability that the
insured must prove from actual bad faith to negligence. 52 The court
reasoned that, since insurance policies typically do not contain a
specific promise that the insurer will settle an action, the insurer's
decision to accept or reject a settlement should not be tested by a
jury on the basis of what a hypothetical reasonable person might
have decided. 53 The range of disagreement among "reasonable"
trial attorneys on the highly subjective question of whether to
accept or reject a settlement offer is too broad to allow a clear,
reliable determination by a.jury. 54 Additionally, and perhaps more
importantly, if a negligence standard were applied, the insurer
49. See id. at -, 319 P.2d at 73 (quoting Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., 208 Or. 1,
298 P.2d 1002, 1003 (1956)).
50. See id.
51. Id. (quoting Southern Fire & Casualty Co. v. Norris, 35 Tenn. App. 657, -. , 250 S.W.2d
785,790(1952)).
52. Id. at -, 319 P.2d at 74. The court stated as follows: "It is a harsh measure to hold the
insurer liable for amounts often far in excess of the agreed limit. To justify such a result requires
substantial culpability on the part of the insurer - bad faith rather than mere negligence." id.
53. See id. (quoting Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, 46 S.W.2d 777 (1932)). In
Mann the insured sued his insurer, Georgia Casualty, claiming that the insurer was negligent in
failing to settle a claim within the policy limits. Georgia Casualty Co. v. Mann, 242 Ky. 447, -,
46 S.W.2d 777, 778-79 (1932). The Kentucky Court of Appeals declined to allow the negligence
standard to be used in such an action. Id. at -, 46 S.W.2d at 780. The court stated the reason for
its decision as follows:
The verdict represents the composite judgment of the assenting jurors, and oftentimes
is but the resultant expression of conflicting views. Common experience teaches us
that, even where the injuries would justify a more substantial verdict, some of the
jurors, doubting whether there is any liability at all, are not willing to go that far, but
insist on the verdict as returned. Calling it negligence for an agent not to divine what
would be the result of a jury trial on disputed evidence, and permitting a jury to
determine the question not solely on the facts as presented to him, but in the light of
the subsequent verdict of thejury, would carry his responsibility beyond the bounds of
reason and further than the demands ofjustice require.
Id. at __, 46 S.W.2d at 779-80.
54. See 155 Cal. App. 2d 697, -, 319 P.2d 69, 74 (1958) (quoting Best Bldg. Co. v.
Employers' Liab. Assurance Corp., 247 N.Y. 451, 160 N.E. 911 (1928)); Manchester Ins. & Indem.
Co. v. Grundy, 531 S.W.2d 493 (Ky. 1976). In Grundy the court decided that a jury, lacking in
training and experience in litigation, is incompetent to pass on the bad faith of the insurer in
rejecting an offer of settlement since even trial lawyers and experts in insurance law might differ. Id.
at 500-01. The issue of bad faith was therefore declared to be one of law decided by the court. Id. But
see Waters v. American Casualty Co., 261 Ala. 252, 73 So. 2d 524 (1953) (bad faith or negligence is
forjury to decide).
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might be forced to bend over backwards to accept settlements that
it, in good faith, considered ill advised. 55 The insurer might be
motivated by the fear that if a judgment in excess of policy limits
should eventuate, a jury - never known for a proclivity to
favor insurance companies - might use the reasonable person
standard as a means to shift the full judgment in excess of policy
limits from the shoulders of the individual insured to the insurer. 56
At this formative stage of the bad faith claim for relief, the
court was also influenced by the possible extent of the remedy. 5"
The parties to an insurance contract base their expectations on the
upper limit of liability fixed by the policy. 58 The court felt that the
radical step of opening up the insurer to a potentially excessive jury
verdict should be taken only in the event that the insurer was guilty
of the "substantial culpability" connoted by the bad faith
standard. 59
The court did indirectly suggest one appropriate context for
the negligence standard. 60 The court stated that the decision
whether to settle "must be based upon a knowledge of the facts and
circumstances upon which liability is predicated, and upon a
knowledge of the nature and extent of the injuries so far as they
reasonably can be ascertained.' '61 This requires a "diligent effort"
on the part of the insurer to discover the relevant facts. 62 It appears
that the negligent failure to discover the factual basis for a good
faith decision might give rise to a claim for relief on the part of the
insured. The jury's determination of negligence in the investigation
stage would not involve the arbitrary second guessing that the court
feared would result if the jury were allowed to determine whether or
not a reasonable person would accept a particular settlement. 63
On the difficult issue of bad faith, the court in Brown was
helpful in outlining eight factors to be considered in determining
55. See 155 Cal. App. 2d at __, 319 P.2d at 74.
56. See id.
57. See id. The court noted that a recovery against the insurer under either the bad faith or
negligence standard could be far more than the mutually agreed policy limit. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. The court distinguished an insured's potential claim for relief against the insurer for
wrongful refusal to assume the defense of an action against the insured by a third party. Id. at -. ,
319 P.2d at 74-75. Since the insurer expressly promises to defend against any action within coverage
of the policy, it could be held liable to the insured for any damages flowing from its merely negligent
failure to defend. Id. at __, 319 P.2d at 75.
60. Id. at__, 319 P.2d at 73.
61. Id. (quoting Hilker v. Western Auto. Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 1, 231 N.W. 257 (1930), aff'don
rehearing, 204 Wis. 12, 235 N.W. 413 (1931)).
62. See id.; see also Radio Taxi Serv. Inc. v. Lincoln Mut. Ins. Co. 31 NJ. 299, -, 157 A.2d
319, 322 (1960) ("a reasonably diligent effort must be made to ascertain the facts upon which a good
faith judgment as to settlement can be formulated").
63. See Brown, 155 Cal. App. 2d at-., 319 P.2d at 74-75.
362 [VOL.. 62:355
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whether the insurer acted properly in refusing to settle an action. 64
These eight factors are:
1) [T]he strength of the injured claimant's case on the
issues of liability and damages; (2) attempts by the in-
surer to induce the insured to contribute to a settlement;
(3) failure of the insurer to properly investigate the
circumstances so as to ascertain the evidence against the
insured; (4) the insurer's rejection of advice of its own
attorney or agent; (5) failure of the insurer to inform the
insured of a compromise offer; (6) the amount of financial
risk to which each party is exposed in the event of a
refusal to settle; (7) the fault of the insured in inducing the
insurer's rejection of the compromise offer by misleading
it as to the facts; and (8) any other factors tending to
establish or negate bad faith on the part of the insurer. 65
While no single factor by itself is determinative of bad faith,
consideration of the totality of pluses and minuses under this list
will give the courts a basis for focusing their determination of this
frequently nebulous issue.
In the ensuing years, practically every court that passed on the
issue fell into step with the California decision and instituted a
claim for relief for the insured based on the insurer's bad faith
refusal to settle .within policy limits. 66 By 1965, however, the
California courts had again moved to the outer fringes of
protectionism for insureds by adopting the negligence standard for
determining liability of the insurer. 67 The test for deciding whether
or not an insurer had given the proper consideration to the interests
of the insured became whether a reasonable insurer with no policy
limits would have accepted the settlement offer. 68
Other courts considered this latest step, but only a scant
minority was willing to leave the relatively settled waters of the bad
faith test to saddle the insurance industry with the negligence
standard. 69 Over the years, however, it has become clear that the
64. See id. at __, 319 P.2d at 75.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., Henke v. Iowa Home Mut. Casualty Co., 97 N.W.2d 168, 172-74 (Iowa 1959)
(accepting the theory of a bad faith recovery in a case of first impression); Western Casualty & Sur.
Co. v. Fowler, 390 P.2d 602 (Wyo. 1964) (sustaining a finding that insurer acted in bad faith in
refusing to accept an offer to settle).
67. SeeCrisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, -, 426 P.2d 173, 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16
(1967). For a discussion of Crisci, see infra notes 73-93 and accompanying text.
68. Seeid. at -, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
69. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Kornbluth, 28 Colo. App. 194, -, 471 P.2d 609,
611 (1970) (general negligence standard applied to insurer's settlement conduct); Knudsen v.
1986] 363
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practical difference between the two tests is negligible in terms of
the outcome of actual cases. 70 This blurring of the differences
between the two tests is due partly to the fact that some
jurisdictions committed to the bad faith test nevertheless permit the
jury to consider negligence on the part of the insurer as a factor
indicating bad faith. 7' At least one jurisdiction simply applies the
"bad faith" label to a test that is based on what a reasonable
insurer would do if there were no policy limit, thereby totally
obliterating the distinction between the two tests. 72 The net result
has been a steady advancement of the law in the direction of
favoring the insured.
By 1967 the California Supreme Court was again edging
toward a quantum leap ahead of the pack in insured protectionism.
In that year, the case of Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. 73 presented the
court with a particularly stark example of bad faith on the part of
the insurer. The plaintiff fell through the insured's negligently
maintained stairway and was left suspended fifteen feet above the
ground. 74 In addition to physical injuries, there was strong
evidence that the accident caused the plaintiff's severe psychosis.
75
Both the insurer's claims manager and counsel agreed that a
verdict of not less than $100,000 was likely. 76 The insurer blatantly
refused to accept the plaintiff's offer to settle the case for the policy
limit of $10,000. 77 The insurer was unwilling to pay one cent
toward settlement on the gamble that the jury would totally believe
the defense's psychiatrists and totally disbelieve the plaintiff's
Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 26 Conn. Supp. 325, -, 222 A.2d 811, 812-13 (Super. Ct.
1966) (insured may assert both a bad faith and a negligence claim against an insurer who failed to
settle); Bennett v. Slater, 154 Ind. App. 67, __, 289 N.E.2d 144, 146 (1972) (insured may bring
negligence action against insurer for insurer's failure to use due care in settlement); Rector v.
Husted, 214 Kan. 230, __, 519 P.2d 634, 640 (1974) ("insurer, in defending and settling claims
against the insured, owes a duty to the insured not only to act in good faith but also to act without
negligence"); Dumas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 111 N.H. 43, -, 274 A.2d 781, 782-85
(1971) (insurer's conduct during settlement subject to negligence standard); Hamilton v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 83 Wash. 2d 787, -, 523 P.2d 193, 196 (1974) (insurer may be liable for damages for a
failure to settle if the failure is negligent or in bad faith).
70. 7C J. APPLEMAN & W. BERDAL, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE S 4712 (rev. ed. 1979)
[hereinafter APPLEMAN]; 14 G. CoucH, R. ANDERSON & M. RHODES, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW
S 51.7 (2d rev. ed. 1982) [hereinafter CoucH].
71. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. White, 248 Md. 324, -, 236 A.2d 269, 273
(1967) ("the insurer's negligence, if any there be, is relevant in determining whether or not it acted
in good faith").
72. See Bowers v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 51 NJ. 62, 237 A.2d 857 (1968). In Bowers the court
stated that it was applying a good faith standard even though it reasoned that good faith in settlement
was determined by what a reasonable insurer would do if there were no policy limits. Id. at 862-70.
73.66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).






psychiatrists. 7 The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the
amount of $100,000, and the insured initiated an action against the
insurer for the amount of the judgment in excess of the policy
limit. 79
The court had no difficulty finding that the plaintiff had met
the burden of establishing the claim for relief under the "prudent
insurer" test, 0 but nevertheless could not resist incorporating into
its decision a lengthy comment strongly favoring a radical change
in the elements of the bad faith cause of action that would push
protectionism for the insured to the extreme.81 By overlaying an
eclectic amalgam of legal principles, the court, in dicta, forged a
theory of strict liability on the part of the insurer.82 The court stated
that "whenever an insurer receives an offer to settle within policy
limits and rejects it, the insurer should be liable in every case for the
amount of any final judgment whether or not within the policy
limits."8 s3 The court reasoned that the duty of the insurer is to
consider the interests of the insured in deciding to accept or reject a
settlement offer within policy limits.84 Since this duty is derived
from the contract principle of the implied covenant of fair dealing
and good faith, the court referred to contract theory to note that
contract obligations are enforced strictly, and not according to
standards of reasonableness.8 5 The court noted that the interest of
the insured always favors acceptance of the offer if it will neutralize
any possible danager of a verdict in excess of policy limits.8 6
Therefore, rejection of the offer could only be the result of placing
the interests of the insurer ahead of those of the insured.87 But the
court's one sided reasoning failed to consider the possiblity of a
baseless or insubstantial suit brought by the plaintiff against the
insured. Settlement of such a suit would produce injustice to the
insurer and, inevitably, if precedent were set, further increase the
rates that must be charged to the public, which always becomes the
ultimate judgment debtor.
78. Id.
79. Id. at-_, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16.
80. Id. The court found that Security had blindly placed its faith in the believability of the
lefense's psychiatrists despite the fact that "the company had been told by a psychiatrist that in a
gKroup of 24 psychiatrists, 12 could be found to support each side." Id. at -, 426 P.2d at 178, 58
Cal. Rptr. at 19.
81. See id. at -., 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
82. See id. The court did not decide whether to accept the strict liability theory since it found that
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Nevertheless, the court shored up the blind side of its theory
by referring to the "common knowledge that settlement is one of
the usual methods by which an insured receives protection under a
liability policy,'"'8 and turned this hypothesized "common
knowledge" into a reasonable expectation of the insured. 89 The
court also hypothesized that, in a personal injury case, a judgment
above the policy limits "furnishes an inference that the value of the
claim is the equivalent of the amount of the judgment and that
acceptance of an offer within those limits was the most reasonable
method of dealing with the claim. "90 The net result was the court's
pronouncement that "an insured should not be permitted to
further its own interests by rejecting opportunities to settle within
the policy limits unless it is also willing to absorb losses which may
result from its failure to settle. "91 Translated, this means that on a
$10,000 policy, if the insurer fails to accept any offer of settlement
within policy limits, it has thereby waived any upper policy limit
and is fully liable for whatever verdict the jury returns. 92
The court proceeded to laud its new theory, first for its
simplicity in avoiding the necessity of determining whether or not
the settlement offer was reasonable, and second for its effect in
deterring insurers from gambling with the money of the insured. 93
However, the theory totally ignores the fact that such a rule would
make insurance companies the happy hunting grounds for any
claimant with the imagination to claim exorbitant damages and
then to offer settlement within policy limits. On the outside chance
that a jury might assume that the injured plaintiff is suing an
insured defendant, and grow generous with insurance company
funds in its verdict, an insurer would be compelled to cave in to a
plaintiff's unreasonable settlement demands. Such a rule is
detrimental to the interests of the public, which relies on insurance
at affordable rates.
88. Id.
89. See id. In support of the strict liability argument the court stated as follows:
Accordingly the rejection of a settlement within the limits where there is any danger of
a judgment in excess of the limits can be justified, if at all, only on the basis of interests
of the insurer, and, in light of the common knowledge that settlement is one of the
usual methods by which an insured receives protection under a liability policy, it may
not be unreasonable for an insured who purchases a policy with limits to believe that a
sum of money equal to the limits is available and will be used so as to avoid liability on
his part with regard to any covered accident.
Id.,
90. Id. The court also noted that it isjust for the insurer to accept the loss from a failure to settle






Fortunately, to date, the rule has not been clearly adopted in
any jurisdiction. It continues, however, to stir rumblings in court
decisions. In the case of Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Insurance
Co. of America,94 for example, the court cited the Crisci rule with
approval95 and stated that "[s]ince an insurer serves only its own
interests by declining to compromise. . . , a decision not to settle is
perforce a selfish one. In attempting to save some of its own money
on the policy, the company necessarily and automatically exposes
the insured to the risk of an excess judgment." 96 Again the rule was
relegated to dicta because the court found actual bad faith on the
part of the insurer. 97 But the proclivities of the court, if the right
case were presented, are clear.98
III. THE PROBLEM
The preceding discussion illustrates the state of the art in
remedies created by the courts to protect insureds against the
pitfalls inherent in the conflict of interest that arises when an
insurance company exercises its right to take control over the
defense of an action against the insured. In years past, because the
situation arose so infrequently, there was little need to consider the
reverse situation - in which the insured had the power to injure
the insurer economically by the exercise of bad faith in interfering
with the settlement process. The only economic leverage the
insured had over the insurer was its ability to refuse to contribute
the amount of the deductible under the policy in the event of a
settlement. Generally, this leverage was miniscule in relation to the
overall size of the policy or the amount of the potential liability
from the plaintiff's action. Disputes concerning the insured's
unwillingness to contribute the deductible to the settlement usually
were handled privately between the insurer and insured as a matter
of business negotiation since they were not substantial enough to
warrant court action. 99
Times, however, have changed. With the expansion of pro
94. 65 N.J. 474, 323 A.2d 495 (1974).
95. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 65 N.J. 474, -, 323 A.2d
495, 509-10 (1974).
96. Id. at __, 323 A.2d at 508.
97. Id. at - ,323 A.2d at 497,513.
98. See id. at __, 323 A.2d at 510. In concluding its discussion of strict liability, the court
stated that "it is unnecessary in the instant case to embrace such an extended rule. But since this
Court as all other courts, seeks to prevent the law from inflicting unjust results, it is not discordant
with its obligation, to foresee the probability or the possibility thereof." Id. (footnote omitted).
99. Kurland & Simon, The Insured's Duty to Tender a Deductible in Settlement, 47 INS. COUNS. J. 552,
552 n. 1 (1980) [hereinafter Kurland].
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plaintiff tort remedies, and the concomitant ballooning of jury
awards in areas such as products liability and medical malpractice,
the cost of insurance in these areas has risen critically. 100 At the
same time, it has become necessary for insureds to increase the
amount of their coverage to previously unimagined levels.
Frequently the only solution to bringing premiums within feasible
limits is for an insured to substantially raise the amount of the
deductible under its products liability policy. By virtue of this
increased retention of risk, insureds - particularly commercial
insureds - have become self-insurers up to levels never before
considered, with insurance companies covering only the excess
portion of the potential liability.
This phenomenon has generated a situation with which the
courts have not yet come to grips. Consider the following fact
pattern: A corporation obtains product liability insurance with an
upper limit of $2,000,000. In order to bring down the premium,
the deductible is raised to $300,000. An injury occurs, allegedly
caused by a defect in the insured's product, and the insured
corporation is sued for $1,500,000. The insurer assumes defense of
the action. After an investigation, experienced defense counsel
determine that there is a substantial likelihood that the plaintiff will
.recover an amount exceeding $1,000,000. Negotiations with the
plaintiff result in an offer of settlement in the amount of $300,000.
Assume that all standards of reasonableness indicate the
wisdom of accepting the offer. Notice, however, that the shoe is
now on the other foot. From the insured's point of view, acceptance
of the settlement offer of $300,000 will cost the insured no less than
would a judgment in the full amount of $1,500,000, since in either
event the insured will only be responsible for the first $300,000.
This appears to make a gamble on a jury verdict worthwhile, since
in any action there is at least a remote possibility of a defendant's
verdict. From the insurer's point of view, however, acceptance of
the settlement offer within the range of the deductible will insulate
it from having to pay a cent, while rejection of the settlement offer
will open it up to a potential loss of $1,200,000.
The insurer now faces a set of unpleasant options if the insured
refuses to tender the deductible toward the settlement. It could
contribute the amount of the deductible itself in order to secure the
settlement, or it could allow the action to go to trial with the
obvious risks. In past times, when the amount of the deductible was




relatively insignificant, the choice was easy. The insurer would
settle the action and privately negotiate repayment or waiver of the
deductible with an eye to the continuation of the relationship
between the insured and insurer. When the level of the retention is
up to $300,000, however, it is more than a matter of absorbing a
slight business loss as an accommodation to a client. At this level,
the insured has substantial leverage that it can bring to bear on the
insurer in order to extort an agreement to waive most or all of the
deductible or to allow the action to go to trial.
Notice, however, that the insured's means of exerting that
leverage are exactly the type of conduct that courts condemned as
bad faith when engaged in by the insurer. 101 Assuming that, absent
the conflict of interest considerations, a reasonable, prudent
defendant would accept settlement at $300,000; and also assuming
that the sole reason for the insured's refusal to pay its agreed share
toward the settlement is the furthering of its own interests to the
detriment of the insurer's interests, then the insured is guilty of
classic bad faith.
This situation poses two serious questions. First, what should
be the response of the courts to the exercise of this type of bad faith
by the insured? When the insurer is guilty of bad faith in the
analogous situation the response is clear - the insurer is liable for
the entire judgment that resulted from the insurer's gambling on a
verdict above policy limits. 102 If the obligation of acting fairly and
in good faith under the contract is borne equally by both parties to
the contract, should not the remedy also be applied reciprocally? In
other words, should the insured be required to indemnify the
insurer for any judgment returned in excess of the deductible if the
insured exercises bad faith in interferring with a reasonable
settlement?
That leads to the second question - how will the courts
actually respond? As indicated earlier, treatment of the two parties
to the insurance contract by the courts has been skewed heavily in
favor of the insured in nearly every context. 0 3 This treatment has
resulted from the court's recognition of the relative impotence of
the insured in its dealings with the insurer. Will the courts'
approach continue into an area in which the insured has actual
101. For a discussion of cases condemning the insurer's bad faith, see supra notes 19-98 and
accompanying text.
102. For a discussion of cases in which courts have held the insurer liable for the exercise of bad
faith, see supra notes 19-98 and accompanying text.
103. For a discussion of cases in which the courts have favored the interests of the insured, see
supra note 5.
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economic clout and has been guilty of bad faith? This Article will
proceed to consider these two questions.
IV. HOW SHOULD THE COURTS RESPOND?
There are currently two gaps in the law that allow the insured
to engage in the kind of bad faith that would result in serious
penalties if committed by the insurer. Both gaps are illustrated by
the hypothetical posed above.
First, if the insurer chooses to bypass the obstruction of the
insured who refuses to contribute the deductible toward a
reasonable settlement, the insurer can accomplish settlement, and
security from a higher judgment, by settling and paying the
$300,000 itself. It would appear that since the first $300,000 was
agreed to be the obligation of the insured as a deductible, the
insurer should be able to bring an action against the insured to
recover this amount. Current law, however, does not appear to
support such a claim for relief. 104 Generally courts have held that
the insured is bound by a settlement entered into by the insurer if
the insurer pays the entire settlement amount and if it is within
policy limits.0 5 But the court's have also held that the insured is not
bound, without his consent, to any settlement that requires the
insured to contribute financially. 10 6 Consequently, the insurer has
no action against the insured for the amount of the deductible paid
by the insurer. 107 Therefore, when the amount of the deductible
and the settlement figure are substantial, the insurer can reach a
reasonable settlement with the plaintiff only at a possibly
unfeasible, and certainly unjust, expense to itself. This is the first
gap in the law.
The second gap is illustrated in the above hypothetical by the
104. But see Kurland, supra note 99, at 554. The authors note that the insurer will have a claim
for relief against the insured for the amount of the deductible. Id. However, because a small amount
of money is usually involved, the claim for relief will not be asserted. Id. at 555.
105. Radcliffe v. Franklin Nat'l Ins. Co., 208 Or. 1, -_, 298 P.2d 1002, 1011 (1956).
106. See, e.g., Haluka v. Baker, 66 Ohio App. 308, -, 34 N.E.2d 68, 71 (1941). In Haluka the
insurer, without telling the insured, entered in to a settlement agreement with the plaintiff. Id. at
__ 34 N.E.2d at 69. Before paying the settlement, the insurer was involuntarily liquidated. Id.
The plaintiff then sued the insured for the settlement amount claiming that the attorney representing
the insurance company was the agent of the insured. Id. at __, 34 N.E.2d at 69-70. The plaintiff
argued that the insured was liable for the settlement amount even though the settlement was entered
into without the insured's consent or knowledge. See id. The court disagreed with the agency theory
and held that "the insurer is not personally bound by the agreement of settlement made by the
insurer, unless it was expressly authorized or subsequently ratified by him, and he likewise is not
bound to pay the amount of the settlement agreed upon." Id. at __ , 34 N.E.2d at 71 (citations
omitted); cf. Employers' Surplus Line Ins. Co. v. City of Baton Rouge, 362 So. 2d 561 (La. 1978)
(policy requiring insured to pay first $10,000 of any judgment or settlement not enforceable unless;
insured consented to the judgment or settlement).
107. But see Kurland, supra note 99.
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fact that, if the insurer chooses not to buy settlement at its own
expense, and trial of the action results in a judgment of, for
example, $1,000,000, the insurer will suffer the loss of $700,000.
The insurer will suffer solely because of the insured's bad faith
refusal to accept the reasonable settlement offer. Currently no
jurisdiction has created a claim for relief, parallel to that afforded
the insured, that would enable the insurer to recover its losses from
the insured. The net result under current law is that the insurer's
only right is to choose which of two unjust losses it will suffer - loss
by settlement or loss by judgment.
The solution to both problems is relatively simple, and
requires nothing more than a certain amount of consistency on the
part of the courts. If the decision were made to impose on the
insured nothing more than the duty to refrain from exercising bad
faith in deciding to accept or reject settlement of an action against
it, both gaps in the law would be filled with no unfairness to either
party. When an insured faced the decision of accepting or rejecting
a reasonable offer of settlement within the deductible, he would
know that if he ignored the interests of the insurer to an extent that
could be considered bad faith, he would open himself up to ultimate
liability for the full amount of any resulting judgment. On the other
hand if the insured gave his consent to the settlement, he would also
be binding himself to the obligation to pay the judgment up to the
amount of the deductible.
Such a duty would leave the insured at liberty to exercise his
own judgment, free from risk, as long as he simply refrained from
exercising that judgment in bad faith. Moreover, there would be
little danger that courts or juries would bend over backwards to find
bad faith on the part of the insured. Thus, there should be no
concern that creation of the claim for relief would open the door to a
creeping expansion of the law as actually applied by judges and
juries against the interests of insureds, as has arguably been the
situation in regard to insurers. 108
The reasons favoring adoption of this claim for relief are
multiple. Perhaps the most salient reason is that it accomplishes
justice. The universally implied covenant applicable to any party
that enters into a contract, whether of insurance or otherwise, is to
act fairly and in good faith toward the other party. To hold the
insurer liable for damages caused to the insured by the insurer's
exercise of bad faith is patently just. But to then turn around and
108. W. SHERNOFF, S. GAGED & H. LEVIN, INSURANCE BAD FAITH LITIGATION S 3.03(I)(a)
(Cum. Supp. 1985) (examining the move by the courts from the bad faith standard to the negligence
standard in cases against the insurer).
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deny liability on the part of the insured for damages caused to the
insurer by the exercise of the same type of bad faith is to make the
affirmative decision to license one party to engage in bad faith.
Whether the result of the insured's unjustified conduct is that the
insurer bears the cost of a needlessly high judgment, or settles and
absorbs the deductible agreed to by the insured in buying the less
expensive policy, the insured has deliberately caused an unfair
expense to the insurer. The insured is permitted either to gamble
with the insurer's funds or to successfully extort the price of the
deductible. Neither outcome is one in which the courts can take any
measure of pride.
The argument that the duty should not be reciprocally
applied because a contract of insurance is an adhesion contract,
with pits and traps imbedded in clauses selfishly drafted by the
insurer, misses the mark in this context. The duty of good faith and
fair dealing is based upon a covenant implied by the courts, not
from a clause drafted by the insurer. 109 The terms of that covenant
apply universally to every type of contract, and can hardly be
argued to take the insured by surprise because he has not read or
understood the written terms of the policy.
If the stumbling block to the court's imposition of this duty on
the insured is the notion that an insured is the economic,
intellectual, and bargaining underdog, the time is ripe for courts to
recognize that not all insureds are created equal. Consider the
situation in which this problem is likely to arise. The only situation
in which an insured will have sufficient leverage over an insurer to
be capable of causing any significant harm by the exercise of bad
faith is when the deductible under the policy is substantial. " 0 Such
insurance policies are seldom purchased by insureds who meet the
stereotype of the insurance buying public fixed in the minds of the
courts. Rather these policies are generally purchased by
corporations with bargaining power and resources of legal and
business advice that enable them to hold their own across the table
from the representative of the insurer.
If the courts are subject to the lingering fear that some
unfortunate, stereotypical insured might be swept up in the broad
application of the new claim for relief, the fear seems groundless.
The fundamental business and talent of courts lies in the drawing of
equitable lines. It seems incomprehensible to think that a court is
incapable of protecting those insureds against whom the new rule
would work an injustice.
109. See, e.g., Brassil v. Maryland Casualty Co.. 210 N.Y. 235, 242, 104 N.E. 622, 624(1914).
110. See Kurland, supra note 99, at 554.
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On a broader level, strong public policy favors the adoption of
this new claim for relief. The entire thrust of the proposed duty is to
prevent the rejection of reasonable out of court settlements. The
benefits of resolving disputes by negotiated agreement of the parties
rather than the decision of twelve strangers, with a concomitant
reduction in the expenditure of precious court time, talent, and
expense, are too obvious to require discussion.
Moreover, early settlement would reduce the necessary legal
expenses encountered by the insurer in defending the tort action
against the insured. Settlement would also put a reasonable lid on
any potentially high jury verdict which the insurer would be
responsible for under the policy. Both of these considerations favor
the interests of the insurance buying public, which ultimately bears
any increase in costs through the payment of increased premiums.
Creation of such a claim for relief would require little
imagination on the part of the court. The path was marked in the
creation of the identical claim for relief for the insured. The source
of the duty at the heart of the tort of bad faith would again be the
implied covenant that each party will act fairly and in good faith to
avoid depriving the other party of the benefit of the contract. 1"
Numerous cases have held that this duty is correlative and binding
on both parties to the insurance contract.' 12
Although no court has actually created such a claim for relief
for the insurer, two particular decisions have contained strong dicta
favoring this step if the right fact situation were present. The first
court to give it serious consideration, needless to say, was the
California Court of Appeals in the case of Transit Casualty Co. v.
Spink Corp. 113 The insured, an engineering firm, was sued in tort.1 14
Settlement negotiations produced an offer of settlement for
$300,000.115 On the advice of an insurance broker, the defendant,
Spink Corporation, took the position that it would not accept
settlement under any circumstances because it feared impairment
I 11.e Comunaic v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2(1 654. 658. 238 P.2d 198, 200 (1958)
("[tihere is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything
which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement").
112. See, e.g., id.; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Altfillisch Constr. Co., 70 Cal. App. 3d 789, 139
Cal. Rptr. 91 (Ct. App. 1977) (insured violated duty of good faith and fair dealing by contracting
away the insurer's subrogation rights).
113. 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360 (Ct. App. 1979), overruled, Commercial Union
Assurance Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26Cal. 3d 912,610 P.2d 1038, 164Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980).
114. Transit Casualty Co. v. Spink Corp., 94 Cal. App. 3d 124, 129, 156 Cal. Rptr. 360, 363
(Ct. App. 1979), overruled, Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d
912, 610 P.2d 1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980). Two people were killed and two people were injured
while Spink was consulting engineer on a construction project. Id. Spink was sued based on its
negligent supervision of a construction project. Id.
115. Id. at 130, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
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of the corporation's future insurability and that of the engineering
industry generally. 116 The jury returned a verdict against Spink. 117
Spink paid its $15,000 deductable while its primary carrier paid
$100,000, the limit of the policy. 118 Transit, Spink's excess carrier,
paid $460,000.119 Spink's excess insurer brought suit against both.
Spink and its primary insurer, charging that the unwarranted
rejection of the settlement offer had caused it direct harm in the
amount of the judgment for which it was responsible under its
coverage. 120
The court recognized the action as a "variant of the refusal-to-
settle syndrome. ' 121 Relying on the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, which it termed "reciprocal, binding the
policyholder as well as the carrier," 122 the court formulated a three
way relationship between the insured, the primary insurer, and the
excess insurer. 123 The court concluded that this relationship
requires "reciprocal duties of care in the conduct of settlement
negotiations." 124 More specifically, the court stated that "when a
damage claim threatens to exceed the primary coverage, the
reasonable foreseeability of impingement on the excess policy
creates a three-way duty-of-care." 125
The court overcame one additional hurdle in imposing the
duty of good faith in settlement decisions on the insured. The
particular policy involved in Spink contained a clause that is more
common to professional liability policies than to general liability
policies. 126 Under that clause, rather than ceding full power to
accomplish settlement to the primary insurer, the insured retained
the ability to withhold consent to any settlement. 127 Generally, the
purpose of such a clause is to enable a professional person to protect




119. Id. Of the $460,000 paid by Transit, $285,000 was a settlement paid to other plaintiffs who
were injured in the same accident. Id.
120. Id. at 131, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 364. Transit claimed it was damaged not only by the amount it
was required to pay under the judgment, but also because it was forced to pay a greater settlement to
the other plaintiffs. Id.
121. Id. The action was "variant" since the excess insurer was suing both the policyholder and
the primary carrier as opposed to the policyholder suing its single carrier. See id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 134, 156Cal. Rptr. at 366.
124. Id.
125. Id. The court explained that "if the plaintiff in an ensuing failure-to-settle suit has been
contributorily negligent, that plaintiff's damage recovery from the other parties will be
proportionately reduced; if all three parties have been negligent, their individual shares of the total
loss may be fixed in a single lawsuit." Id.
126. Id. at 135, 156Cal. Rptr. at 367.
127. Id. at 129-30, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64.
[VOL. 62:355
GOOD FAITH
might arise from a settlement. 12  The insured argued that, by
paying for the addition of the settlement clause, it was purchasing
the right to reject any settlement, reasonable or otherwise, for the
sole purpose of protecting its professional standing. 129 The court
found that such an interpretation of the settlement clause ran
counter to the strong public policy in favor of extrajudicial
settlements, and therefore the court refused to apply the clause to
defeat the insured's duty under the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing. 130
At this point, it appeared that the claim for relief against the
insured was viable, and that once more California would lead the
nation into a new area of tort law. The infant tort, however,
scarcely lived out the year in California, as will be seen further
along in the discussion. 131
During the same year that Spink was decided, the federal
district court for the district of Louisiana was presented with a
similar conflict. In the case of Offshore Logistics Services, Inc. v.
Arkwright-Boston Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co., 132 the insured
was sued in negligence for damage caused to a production platform
by one of its ships. 133 The insured handled the settlement
negotiations and refused, at one stage, to accept a settlement offer
of $86,000, well within the primary coverage of $100,000.134 When
the action was ultimately settled for $108,000, the excess insurer,
Arkwright-Boston, refused to pay the $8000 excess.1 35 The insured
advanced the $8000 itself and then brought an action against the
excess insurer for that amount.1 36 The defense of the excess insurer
was that the insured had breached a duty of good faith in rejecting a
reasonable settlement within primary coverage.' 3 7 The issue was
therefore raised as to whether or not the insured owed any such
duty in the first place. 138
The significant point of the court's decision is not that it
128, Id. at 135, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 135-36, 156 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
131. See Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 610 P.2d
1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980). For a discussion of Commercial Union, see infra notes 152-65 and
accompanying text.
132. 469 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D. La. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 1142, 1143-45 (5th Cir. 1981).
133. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 469 F. Supp. 1099,
1101 (E.D. La. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 1142, 1143-45 (5th Cir. 1981).
134. Id. at 1101, 1104.
135. Id. at 1101.
136. Id. at 1101-02.
137. Id. at 1103. Arkwright-Boston also asserted the defense that offshore did not give sufficient
notice of the accident and pending lawsuit. Id. at 1102-03. The court determined that Arkwright-
Boston failed to show any prejudice from the delay of notification. Id,
138. See id. at 1103-04.
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accepted the theory, but that it clearly failed to reject it.139 The
decision for the insured was based on the failure of the excess
insurer to prove bad faith on the part of the insured during
settlement negotiations.1 4 0  The decision contains the clear
implication, however, that if the insurer had met the factual burden
of proof, the court would have recognized the duty of good faith on
the part of the insured.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the
implication of the lower court was left undisturbed. 141 The court
stated, without negative comment, that the "parties agree that if
Offshore [the insured] failed to act in good faith in settling the claim
by Chevron, Offshore will be liable for the excess judgment. ' ' 142
The court noted other cases that dealt with the duty owed by the
insurer to the insured, apparently assuming that this good faith
duty applied equally to the insured. 143 While this may seem a
tenuous trumpet call to herald the arrival of such a significant break
in the traditional pattern of the law, it is nevertheless more
significant than silence.
One other faint flicker of recognition of a duty on the part of
the insured occurred in the case of Knobloch v. Royal Globe Insurance
Co. 144 In Royal Globe the court noted that if the insured refuses to
make a contribution toward settlement when the insurer has offered
the policy limits as its part of the settlement, the insured cannot
succeed in an action against the insurer for failure to settle in good
faith. 1 4 5 This principle would also apply to the case in which an
insured refuses to tender the amount of the deductible toward a
reasonable settlement. 146 While this is far from the creation of a
claim for relief against the insured, it is at least an initial step
toward putting insureds on notice that they cannot ignore their
responsibility to act in good faith.
139. See id. at 1103-05.
140. Id. at 1104-05. The court dismissed Arkwright-Boston's attempt to prove bad faith by the
testimony of the attorney hired by Arkwright-Boston to defend them in the original suit. Id. at 1105.
The court noted that the attorney's involvement in the original case "was tangential." Id. The court
also noted that the insured requested its primary carrier to put aside $85,000 in case of a judgment
for the plaintiff. Id. The court reasoned that the $75,000 originally offered as a settlement by the
defendant must have been in good faith since "it seems likely that a defendant would establish a
reserve at a little more than it actually thought necessary, just to be on the safe side." Id. (emphasis in
original).
141. Ser Offshore lo.gistics Scrviccs, Inc. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfis. Mut. Ins. Co.. 639 F.2d
1142, 1143-45(5thCir. 1981).
142. Id. at 1144.
143. Id. at 1144 n.3.
144. 46 A.D.2d 278, 362 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1974).
145. Knobloch v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 46 A.D.2d 278, -, 362 N.Y.S.2d 492, 497-501
(1974).
146. Kurland, supra note 99, at 555.
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An additional argument in favor of reciprocal application of
the duty of good faith is found in the comparison between the
insured/insurer relationship and the primary insurer/excess insurer
relationship. 47 Generally, courts have held that a claim for relief
will lie in favor of an excess insurer that is compelled to pay a
judgment because of the bad faith refusal of the primary insurer to
settle an action within primary coverage. 48 When the insured has
both primary and excess insurance, primary insurance is quite
similar to a deductible carried by an insured.4 9 Therefore, it would
be consistent to allow an insurer to bring the same type of action
against the insured that an excess carrier is able to bring against a
primary carrier. 50 In fact, the argument proceeds afortiori since the
only basis for the excess insurer's action is the fact that it is
equitably subrogated to the claim for relief of the insured, while the
primary insurer is linked directly by contract to the insured. '5 '
The ends of justice for the parties, the courts, and the public
would be most effectively served by the creation of a claim for relief
for the insurer against the insured for the exercise of bad faith in
hindering the reasonable settlement of an action that results in an
obligation on the part of the insurer to pay more than it would have
had to pay under the settlement. This far from concludes the story,
however. It merely gets us to the next, and probably more
significant question - what is the actual response of the courts
likely to be?
V. HOW WILL THE COURTS RESPOND?
With the exception of the meager gleanings of favorable court
response to the proposed claim for relief discussed above, there is
nothing in the history of the judicial treatment of issues between
insurers and insureds to suggest that insurers have a chance of
widespread equal treatment in this respect. Consider, for example,
147. See id.
148. See, e.g., Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Group, 76 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 1045,
143 Cal. Rptr. 415, 473 (1978) (excess carrier may recover damages caused by the bad faith
settlement activities of the primary carrier); Penn v. Amalgamated Gen. Agencies, 148 N.J. Super.
419, -, 372 A.2d 1124, 1127 (1977) ("[t]he primary carrier owes to the excess carrier the same
positive duty to take the initiative and attempt to negotiate a settlement within its policy limit that it
owes to its assured").
149. Kurland, supra note 99, at 555.
150. Id.
151. See Northwestern, 76 Cal. App. 3d at 1045, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 423. The basis for the action by
the excess insurer against the primary insurer is found in the theory that since the excess insurer is
required to pay the amount of the liability that the insured would be required to pay absent excess
insurance, the excess insurer is subrogated to the insured's claim for relief against the primary
insurer. See id.
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the death knell sounded by the California Supreme Court in
Commercial Union Assurance co. v. Safeway Stores152 to the doctrine
created in the Spinks case one year earlier. 153 In Commercial Union
the excess carrier brought suit against the insured and the primary
carrier for failure to take the opportunity to settle an action against
the insured for $50,000, the primary policy limit.154 The failure to
settle resulted in a judgment against the insured for $125,000.155 In
discussing the theory of reciprocity of the duty to excercise good
faith in settlement proceedings, the court stated that "[t]his theory,
while possessing superficial plausibility and exquisite simplicity,
cannot withstand closer analysis." 15 6 While conceding, somewhat
pointlessly, that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a "two-
way-street," the court found that "duty" meant two different
things depending on whether it was the insured's or insurer's ox
that was being gored. 157
The court relied on what it perceived to be the two major
pillars supporting the claim for relief against the insurer to show
that the situations were so radically different that they called for
different conclusions. First, the court acknowledged that the
insured had a legitimate expectation that the insurer would use
settlement within policy limits to protect him.1 58 When it looked
back the other way, however, the court concluded that since the
insured had promised neither to defend nor indemnify the insurer,
the insurer could have no such reasonable expectation that the
insured would employ settlement below the initiation level of the
excess policy for the insurer's protection.1 59 The court held,
therefore, that an excess insurance policy "imposes no implied
duty upon the insured to accept a settlement offer which would
avoid exposing the insurer to liability.' '160
152. 26 Cal. 3d 912, 610 P.2d 1038, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1980).
153. Commercial Union Assurance Co. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 26 Cal. 3d 912, 921, 610 P.2d
1038, 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. 709, 714 (1980). For a discussion of Spink, see supra notes 113-30 and
accompanying text.
154. 26 Cal. 3d at 916, 610 P.2d at 1040, 164 Cal, Rptr. at 711. Safeway had a $50,000 primary
insurance policy with Travelers Insurance Company. Id. Safeway was self-insured for liability
between the amounts of $50,000 and $100,000. Id. Safeway obtained excess insurance from the
plaintiff to cover Safeway's liability between the amounts of $100,000 and $20 million. Id.
Commercial claimed that Safeway and Travelers owed Commercial a duty to settle the claim for
under $100,000 when they had the opportunity to do so. Id. In addition Commercial claimed that
Safeway and Travelers knew or should have known that a judgment in excess of $100,000 would
result. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 918, 610 P.2d at 1041, 164Cal. Rptr. at 712.
157. See id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 919,610 P.2d at 1041-42, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13.
160. Id. at921, 610 P.2d at 1043, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
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The problem with this argument is that the duty to settle in
good faith on either side need not depend for its existence on the
court's imaginative presumption of what insureds expect. If, in
fact, insureds have formulated any such expectation, it is more than
likely the result of the court's self-fulfilling prophecy which
informed insureds that these rights were theirs to expect. A more
realistic foundation for the duty to exercise good faith in settlement
decisions is the implied covenant that any party to a contract will
exercise good faith in all matters affecting the ability of the other
party to receive the benefits of the contract. This covenant should
provide a basis for equal rights and remedies on both sides.
The second basis on which the court distinguished the rights of
the insured from those of the insurer is the matter of control.1 61
Since, in most situations, the primary insurance policy provides
that the insurer has the right to take control of the litigation for
purposes of trial or settlement, the insured is considered to be at the
mercy of the insurer if that insurer chooses to gamble with the
insured's funds beyond policy limits.1 62 The court found this
reasoning not applicable since, in this case, the policyholder was
self-insured for an amount between the upper limit of the primary
policy and the bottom limit of the excess policy. 163 As such, the
policyholder gambled with its own money as much as that of the
excess carrier.1 64 What the court failed to recognize is that in
circumstances in which reasonable settlement can occur within the
range of a large deductible, the party in control - the party that
can choose to gamble with the funds of the other - is the
insured. 165
VI. CONCLUSION
Regardless of where the equities may lie on this issue, the
future course of the law seems fairly predictable. Until the courts
are willing to liberate their thinking from the restrictive notions of
fictitious expectations which they have divined and projected into
the minds of passive insureds, and until those same courts are
willing to recognize that commercial and industrial insureds do not
fit within the stereotype of "sailors, idiots, and infants," there is
scarcely a chance that the law will deal even-handedly with the two
parties to insurance contracts.




165. See id. at 919-20, 610 P.2d at 1042-43, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 713-14.
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